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Monitoring Policies and Gig Workers’ Job Preferences 
 
Abstract 
Monitoring, a digital surveillance technology that allows employers to track the activities of workers, is 
ubiquitous in the gig economy where workforce is distributed.  However, workers are often reluctant to be 
monitored due to privacy concerns, resulting in a hidden economic cost for employers as workers tend to 
demand higher wages for monitored jobs. To help employers make informed decisions about whether to 
adopt monitoring and what monitoring policy to use, we investigate how three common aspects of 
monitoring affect workers’ willingness to accept monitored jobs, as well as the underlying mechanisms, 
through online experiments on two gig economy platforms (Amazon Mechanical Turk and Prolific). The 
three aspects of monitoring are intensity (how much information is collected), transparency (whether the 
monitoring policy is disclosed to workers), and control (whether workers can remove sensitive information). 
We find that, as the monitoring intensity increases, workers become less likely to accept monitoring due to 
elevated privacy concerns. Furthermore, we find that being transparent about the monitoring policy 
increases workers’ willingness to accept monitoring only when the monitoring intensity is low, as 
transparent disclosure does not reduce privacy concerns over high-intensity monitoring. Interestingly, 
providing control over high-intensity monitoring does not significantly reduce workers’ privacy concerns 
either, rendering this well-intentioned policy ineffective. Finally, females are more willing to accept 
monitored jobs than males as they perceive higher payment protection from monitoring and have lower 
privacy concerns. On average, we estimate that the compensations required for workers to accept 
monitoring are $1.8/hr for AMT workers and $1.6/hr for Prolific workers, which translate to roughly 37.3% 
and 28.5% of their average hourly wages, respectively. 
 
Keywords: monitoring, gig economy, privacy concerns, payment protection, gender, willingness to accept 
(WTA) 
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1. Introduction 
The gig economy has seen tremendous growth in the past decade (Huang et al. 2020). The COVID-19 
pandemic has accelerated the growth as unemployment soars and massive numbers of workers transitioned 
into the gig economy. For example, Upwork reported a 50% increase in sign-ups since the pandemic began,1 
and Instacart hired 300,000 new gig workers in just one month.2 On the demand side, firms struggling 
during the pandemic also increased their reliance on gig workers rather than hiring full-time employees.3 
Despite the rapid growth of the gig economy, major challenges linger in this market. On the demand 
side, employers have little control over gig workers beyond the contractual requirements, making it difficult 
to manage workers’ progress and evaluate their performance on the job. On the supply side, gig workers 
are frustrated about frequently having their work output rejected for unjustifiable reasons or even no reason 
at all (Benson et al. 2020). According to a survey conducted by the International Labor Organization on 
3,500 gig workers across various gig platforms (e.g., AMT and Prolific), nearly 90% of workers have ever 
had work rejected and only 12% of workers stated that all the rejections were justifiable.4 It has been 
estimated that on average, the loss due to unpaid work amounts to 13% of gig workers’ annual income.5 
The above challenges facing employers and workers largely result from the asymmetric information 
between the two parties. To mitigate the potential moral hazard problem due to information asymmetry, 
employers usually use efficiency wages to discourage workers from shirking (Akerlof 1984, Stiglitz 1987). 
Nevertheless, an efficiency wage may not pay off to employers because the decrease in shirking may not 
offset the efficiency wage premium (Cappelli and Chauvin 1991). Recently, with advancements in digital 
surveillance technologies, monitoring has become an attractive alternative to address the information 
asymmetry problem, especially for gig economy platforms that facilitate transactions between strangers. 
For instance, Upwork provides a desktop app that can automatically take screenshots and track workers’ 
 
1 https://time.com/5836868/gig-economy-coronavirus/ 







activities in hourly projects.6 From the perspective of employers, monitoring allows them to track workers’ 
progress and intervene when necessary. Prior studies have shown that monitoring can improve workers’ 
productivity (Duflo et al. 2012, Hubbard 2000). From the perspective of workers, the information recorded 
by monitoring systems, such as working hours and computer screenshots, can serve as proof of their work 
and protect them from unjustified rejections. Such payment protection is often featured by gig economy 
platforms (e.g., Upwork and Freelancer) to encourage workers to use their monitoring apps. Therefore, 
monitoring has the potential to overcome the aforementioned challenges facing employers and workers.  
However, since monitoring systems operate by continuously collecting information (e.g., working 
hours, computer screenshots, or moving routes) from workers, they may lead to serious privacy concerns. 
As a result, workers may be reluctant to take jobs that are monitored by employers. For example, Uber’s 
monitoring system was considered intrusive by some drivers, and some even filed a lawsuit against Uber 
to protect their privacy.7 In theory, workers’ privacy concerns over monitoring may be influenced by 
multiple factors, such as how much information is collected (i.e., intensity), whether the information 
collection policy is fully disclosed to workers (i.e., transparency), and whether workers have control over 
the collected information (i.e., control). Specifically, monitoring with a higher intensity may lead to 
stronger privacy concerns as privacy concerns increase with the amount of information collected (Gandy 
1993, Malhotra et al. 2004). In contrast, being transparent about the information collection process can 
increase the perceived fairness and appropriateness of monitoring systems, which reduces workers’ privacy 
concerns (Culnan and Armstrong 1999). Similarly, a monitoring system that provides workers certain 
control over the information being collected (e.g., allowing workers to remove sensitive computer 
screenshots captured by the monitoring system) may alleviate workers’ privacy concerns, because such a 
monitoring policy is more likely to be considered as fair and appropriate (Culnan and Armstrong 1999).  
Aligned with the above mentioned three dimensions of monitoring policy (i.e., intensity, transparency, 
and control), three corresponding industry practices are used to alleviate workers’ privacy concerns and 
 
6 https://support.upwork.com/hc/en-us/articles/211064038-About-the-Desktop-App.   
7 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/22/uber-faces-fresh-legal-challenge-over-driver-data.html.  
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lower their resistance against monitoring. The first practice is to lower the intensity of monitoring. For 
example, while many third-party monitoring apps record workers’ working hours and computer screenshots 
(e.g., Monitask, StaffCop), some monitoring apps only track working hours (e.g., Harvest Forecast, 
WorkTime). The second practice is to increase the transparency of monitoring by informing workers how 
they will be monitored. For instance, unlike monitoring apps that do not disclose the details about what 
information is monitored to workers, TimeDoctor allows workers to inspect the monitored records.8 The 
third practice is to provide workers control over the information recorded. Toward that end, some 
monitoring apps (e.g., Screenmeter) allow workers to delete a few screenshots that contain sensitive 
information or that they feel uncomfortable sharing. Notably, the latter two practices are also advocated by 
government agencies (e.g., White House and Federal Trade Commission9) and academic scholars (e.g., 
Adjerid et al. 2013, Malhotra et al. 2004). 
Despite the practical interest in the design of monitoring policies, whether and to what extent they can 
alleviate privacy concerns are still open questions. Moreover, changes in the monitoring policy may also 
influence workers’ perceived payment protection from monitoring, which is considered as a key benefit for 
gig workers. For example, lowering the monitoring intensity may make the resulting monitoring logs less 
effective in protecting workers from unjustified rejections (Moore and Hayes 2018). On the contrary, when 
the monitoring intensity is high, being more transparent about the monitoring policy may increase workers’ 
perceived payment protection from monitoring. Considering the potential countervailing roles of these two 
mechanisms (privacy concern and payment protection), how different types of monitoring policies affect 
workers’ resistance against monitored jobs is not clear. 
Notably, workers’ privacy concerns over and perceived payment protection from monitoring may vary 
across gender, based on the literature on the gender differences in privacy concerns and risk attitudes. Some 
 
8 https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/inside-invasive-secretive-bossware-tracking-workers 
9 See more on White House Consumer Bill of Rights 





mixed findings are relevant to the potentially different effects of monitoring on privacy concerns by gender. 
On the one hand, females are more likely to disclose their personal information than males (Denniston et 
al. 2010, Hollenbaugh and Everett 2013, Kays et al. 2012). On the other hand, females tend to worry about 
their privacy more than males when evaluating the potential risk of privacy invasion (Hoy and Milne 2010, 
Rowan and Dehlinger 2014, Sheehan 1999). Since the privacy concerns over monitoring depend on both 
the willingness to disclose information and the evaluation of potential negative consequences due to privacy 
invasion, it is unclear whether males or females have stronger privacy concerns in the presence of 
monitoring. In addition to privacy concerns, the perceived payment protection from monitoring may also 
vary across gender. Since females are more risk-averse than males when making economic decisions 
(Croson and Gneezy 2009, Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007), they may value the payment protection from 
monitoring more than males, rendering them more open to monitoring.  
To help employers and platforms make informed decisions regarding whether they should adopt 
monitoring and what monitoring policy to employ, it is important to understand how different monitoring 
policies influence workers’ perception and acceptance of monitoring. Toward that end, we seek to address 
the following research questions in this study:    
1) How do different dimensions of monitoring policy (i.e., intensity, transparency, and control) affect 
workers’ choices between monitored jobs and unmonitored jobs?  
2) How do different dimensions of monitoring policy (i.e., intensity, transparency, and control) affect 
workers’ privacy concerns over monitoring and perceived payment protection from monitoring? 
3) Is there a gender difference in the perception and acceptance of monitoring? 
4) What is the compensation required for workers to choose a monitored job over an unmonitored (but 
otherwise identical) job?   
To answer the first three research questions, we conduct two online experiments in the job screening 
process for an image-labeling task on two major gig economy platforms, i.e., AMT and Prolific. Gig 
workers participating in our experiments are randomly assigned into four groups with different monitoring 
policies: a) the only_time group in which only workers’ working hours are tracked (a common monitoring 
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policy adopted by many gig platforms such as AMT and Prolific); b) the all_screenshots groups, in which 
both working hours and computer screenshots are tracked (a high intensity monitoring policy adopted by 
monitoring apps such as Monitask and StaffCop); c) the no_disclosure group, in which workers are aware 
of monitoring but not informed how they will be monitored (a monitoring policy without transparency such 
as the one employed by Uber10); and d) the controlled_screenshots group, in which both working hours and 
computer screenshots are recorded but workers have the option to remove some screenshots (a monitoring 
policy offered by Freelancer and Screenmeter). We further measure workers’ privacy concerns over and 
perceived payment protection from monitoring in different monitoring policy groups. 
Since the compensation required for an individual to accept certain negative utility is also known as 
the willingness to accept (WTA) compensation (Martín-Fernández et al. 2010), our last research question 
boils down to measuring the WTA for monitoring. The current best practice to measure individuals’ 
willingness to pay or accept is discrete choice experiments (Hedegaard and Tyran 2018, Martín-Fernández 
et al. 2010, Mas and Pallais 2017). For instance, Hedegaard and Tyran (2018) measure workers’ willingness 
to pay for discrimination based on their choices between two jobs with a same-ethnic vs. different-ethnic 
coworker. Mas and Pallais (2017) estimate workers’ willingness to pay for alternative work arrangements 
by offering each worker two job options at different wages, one with a standard schedule and the other with 
a flexible schedule. Following this practice, we estimate workers’ WTA for monitoring by randomizing the 
wage difference between a monitored job and an unmonitored job and observing workers’ acceptance of 
the monitored job at different levels of wage differences, under different monitoring policies. 
Several findings emerge from our experiments: 1) Increasing the monitoring intensity reduces workers’ 
propensity to accept monitoring by increasing their privacy concerns. 2) When the monitoring intensity is 
low, being transparent about the monitoring policy can increase workers’ propensity to accept monitoring 
by reducing their privacy concerns. Conversely, when the monitoring intensity is high, being transparent 
 
10 Uber’s driver contract states that the company may track drivers’ geolocation, but it does not explain exactly what 
information is collected. See https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-app-will-soon-begin-tracking-driving-behavior-
1467194404 for more details. 
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about the monitoring policy does not significantly affect workers’ propensity to accept monitoring, though 
it can increase their perceived payment protection. 3) Notably, when the monitoring intensity is high, 
providing control over monitored information has no significant effect on either privacy concerns or 
perceived payment protection, rendering this policy ineffective. 4) Compared to males, females are more 
willing to accept monitored jobs because they perceive lower privacy concerns over and higher payment 
protection from monitoring. Our further analyses show that the compensation required for gig workers to 
accept monitoring is $1.6~1.8 per hour ($1.4~1.7 per hour for females and $1.9~2.0 per hour for males), 
which is a noneligible economic cost for employers. These findings have important implications in the 
design and deployment of monitoring policies for employers on gig economy platforms. 
Our study contributes to several streams of literature. First, our study is among the first to measure the 
effect of monitoring on recruitment cost, which has been ignored by the prior studies on monitoring (Duflo 
et al. 2012, Hubbard 2000). Second, our study also contributes to the privacy literature. While some 
pioneering studies have shown that workers are uncomfortable with monitoring due to privacy concerns 
(Townsend and Bennett 2003, Brandimarte et al. 2013), it is unknown whether and to what extent they need 
to be compensated to accept monitoring, given the well-documented discrepancy between privacy-related 
attitude and behavior (Acquisti et al. 2015). Third, our study provides important insights into the optimal 
design of monitoring policies, in terms of intensity, transparency, and control. Last but not least, the 
heterogeneity in workers’ WTAs for monitoring across gender advances our understanding of the 
heterogeneous compensation differentials for non-wage job amenities (Mas and Pallais 2017, Wiswall and 
Zafar 2018).  
2. Theoretical Background 
Applying the privacy calculus theory (Culnan and Armstrong 1999, Jiang et al. 2013) into the context 
of monitoring in gig economy platforms, workers’ willingness to disclose information to the monitoring 
system should depend on the tradeoff between the perceived cost (i.e., privacy concerns) and benefit (i.e., 
payment protection). In this section, we draw on the literature and discuss how the intensity, transparency, 
and control of monitoring policy may influence privacy concerns, the perceived payment protection, and 
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ultimately workers’ acceptance of monitoring.  
2.1. Intensity 
The intensity of monitoring refers to the volume and sensitivity of the information that is collected by 
the monitoring system. The intensity of monitoring may influence both the privacy concerns and the 
perceived payment protection of workers, as elaborated below. 
Intensity and privacy concerns. As the monitoring system collects more information from workers, 
especially sensitive information, the monitoring intensity increases. For instance, a monitoring policy that 
only tracks time is often considered as low-intensity monitoring, as it only records some basic non-sensitive 
information. In contrast, a monitoring that captures computer screenshots in addition to tracking time is 
often considered as high-intensity monitoring, as the screenshots may contain sensitive information of 
workers. When the monitoring system collects more (sensitive) information, individuals tend to have a 
stronger concern about their privacy being invaded (Gandy 1993). Moreover, individuals may perceive a 
higher vulnerability (Martin et al. 2017) due to the potential misuse of their data by others, which can result 
in personal data leakage, unauthorized secondary usage, or improper access of workers’ private information. 
As such, workers’ privacy concerns are likely to increase with the intensity of monitoring.  
Intensity and payment protection. Monitoring is usually touted as a feature that offers payment 
protection by gig economy platforms and gig workers generally share this point of view. According to a 
survey on participants from 25 different organizations by Stanton and Weiss (2000), some respondents 
believed that monitoring helps ensure that their working hours are 100% billable. The level of workers’ 
perceived payment protection depends on the extent and amount of recorded information that can serve as 
evidence of their work. When more detailed information is collected by the monitoring system, workers are 
likely to be more confident that the monitoring system records sufficient information to protect them from 
potential payment disputes (Moore and Hayes 2018). Therefore, the perceived payment protection is also 
expected to increase with the intensity of monitoring. 
Since both the privacy concerns and perceived payment protection of workers are expected to increase 
with the intensity of monitoring, the impact of monitoring intensity on workers’ overall attitude toward 
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monitoring is unclear. Whether workers are more likely to accept monitored jobs when the intensity of 
monitoring increases depends on workers’ tradeoff and weights on privacy concerns and perceived payment 
protection, and the extent to which each perception changes with the increasing intensity of monitoring. 
2.2. Transparency 
Karwatzki et al. (2017, p. 372) argue that “transparency features give an overview and thus enhance 
the sense of which information is collected and how it could be used by organizations in an accessible and 
understandable way.” In the context of monitoring, transparency refers to the disclosure of what information 
is collected and how it is collected. Below we discuss how transparency may influence workers’ privacy 
concerns and perceived payment protection. 
Transparency and privacy concerns. In the absence of transparency, workers face uncertainty 
regarding what and how data will be collected, which may lead them to expect the worst (Friedland 1982). 
That is, when the monitoring policy is not disclosed, workers tend to assume the intensity of the monitoring 
system to be rather invasive, elevating their privacy concerns. The impact of transparency on workers’ 
privacy concerns may depend on the monitoring intensity. Specifically, when the monitoring intensity is 
low, being transparent about the monitoring policy can avoid unnecessary privacy concerns due to the 
uncertainty about the monitoring policy. However, when the monitoring intensity is high, while a 
transparent monitoring policy resolves workers’ uncertainty, it simply confirms workers’ expectation of 
intense monitoring and hence may not be particularly effective in alleviating their privacy concerns. 
In addition to reducing uncertainty, transparency can also attenuate workers’ privacy concerns by 
increasing the perceived procedural fairness of the monitoring policy. As suggested by Culnan and 
Armstrong (1999), the disclosure of data collection practices (termed ‘notice’) lies at the core of procedural 
fairness. The transparent disclosure of monitoring policy therefore increases the perceived procedural 
fairness of a monitoring policy. Prior work has shown that individuals tend to express lower privacy 
concerns when a data collection practice is considered fair (Culnan and Armstrong 1999). As such, workers’ 
privacy concerns may decrease with the transparency of the monitoring policy. However, it should be noted 
that workers’ perception of procedural fairness also depends on whether they believe the information 
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collected or used by the monitoring system is relevant, necessary, and appropriate (Alge 2001). When the 
information collected by the monitoring system is excessive or overly sensitive (i.e., when the monitoring 
intensity is high), transparency is not sufficient to justify the procedural fairness of the monitoring policy. 
Therefore, a transparent monitoring policy is expected to be more effective in alleviating privacy concerns 
when the monitoring intensity is low. 
Transparency and payment protection. When the monitoring policy is opaque, workers are uncertain 
about what information is collected. Accordingly, they may be skeptical about whether the information 
recorded by the monitoring system can be used as evidence for their work. Conversely, a transparent 
monitoring policy provides workers the necessary information to evaluate whether the recorded information 
can protect them from payment disputes (Karwatzki et al. 2017). In particular, when the monitoring 
intensity is high, transparent disclosure can assure workers that the collected information is detailed enough 
to justify their work. In this sense, workers may perceive stronger payment protection from a transparent 
monitoring policy than a non-transparent one. However, when the monitoring intensity is low, being 
transparent need not increase the perceived payment protection due to the limited information tracked by 
the monitoring system. Therefore, it is possible that transparency increases the workers’ perceived payment 
protection only when the monitoring intensity is high. 
Based on the above discussion, the transparency of monitoring policy may influence workers’ 
acceptance of monitoring through two distinct mechanisms. Specifically, when the monitoring intensity is 
high, the transparency about monitoring policy may increase workers’ perceived payment protection and 
hence increase their likelihood to choose monitored jobs. When the monitoring intensity is low, the reduced 
uncertainty and improved procedural fairness resulting from transparency can effectively alleviate workers’ 
privacy concerns, making workers more likely to choose monitored jobs.  
2.3. Control 
Control and privacy concerns. In the monitoring context, control means whether individuals have the 
“ability to modify characteristics of or eliminate the occurrence of monitoring” (Stanton 2000, p. 96). The 
provision of control allows workers to remove some screenshots that contain sensitive information or that 
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they feel uncomfortable sharing with others. Building on the extant literature, we argue that providing 
control can alleviate workers’ privacy concerns for several reasons. First, the provision of control allows 
workers to remove or withhold information they are not willing to share with employers, which can greatly 
alleviate their concerns over the sharing of sensitive information. Second, psychologically, the provision of 
control also gives workers a sense of autonomy. With the autonomy to control the collection of their 
personal information, workers are less likely to perceive vulnerability (Martin et al. 2017), lowering their 
privacy concerns. Third, the provision of control can increase the perceived procedural fairness of the 
monitoring policy (Culnan and Armstrong 1999), which subsequently leads to lower privacy concerns 
(Alge 2001).  
Control and payment protection. The provision of control may lower workers’ perceived payment 
protection from monitoring to some extent because the removed information cannot be used as evidence of 
work anymore. In addition, employers may become more skeptical about the monitoring records when 
workers have the right to cherry-pick which of them to submit, which may also weaken workers’ perceived 
payment protection. Nonetheless, the negative effect of control on payment protection, if any, is not 
expected to be particularly strong, since workers have the right to keep any relevant information that can 
help them win potential disputes.   
As the provision of control has the potential to reduce both privacy concerns and perceived payment 
protection, whether and how control affects workers’ acceptance of monitoring are not clear.  
2.4. Gender Differences 
Males and females may respond to monitoring differently due to gender differences in privacy 
concerns and perceived payment protection. The gender difference in privacy concerns has been well-
documented in the literature, though the findings vary across attitude and behavior, which is also known as 
the privacy paradox (Acquisti et al. 2015). Specifically, when responding to hypothetical questions 
regarding privacy invasion, females tend to express higher privacy concerns than males (Hoy and Milne 
2010, Rowan and Dehlinger 2014). However, in terms of actual behavior, females have shown to disclose 
more private information than males on online platforms (Hollenbaugh and Everett 2013, Sheehan 1999) 
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and online surveys (Denniston et al. 2010, Kays et al. 2012). One potential explanation for the latter finding 
is that females tend to be more compliant than males (Sheehan 1999). Given that employers and workers 
may both potentially benefit from monitoring, it is possible that females may evaluate monitoring from a 
practical perspective of whether they should comply with monitoring and hence express lower privacy 
concerns over monitoring than males.  
The potential gender difference in payment protection depends on the gender difference in risk 
attitudes. Prior research suggests that females are more risk-averse than males in general (Croson and 
Gneezy 2009, Fellner and Maciejovsky 2007), especially when there is a safe option (Filippin and Crosetto 
2016). Given that it is common for gig workers to get rejected for their work, the payment protection 
provided by monitoring may be perceived as a safe option that can protect them from potential payment 
disputes. As a result, females who are more risk-averse than males may perceive a higher level of payment 
protection from monitoring.  
Since job choices reflect more about one’s behavior than attitude, we expect the gender difference in 
behavior to play a larger role in gig workers’ choices between monitored and unmonitored jobs, suggesting 
that females may be more willing to comply with monitoring policies. Considering that females may also 
perceive a higher level of payment protection from monitoring due to their stronger risk aversion, we expect 
that females are more likely to accept monitored jobs than males. 
Table 1 summarizes how the perception and acceptance of monitoring may be influenced by the 
intensity, transparency, and control of monitoring policies, as well as the gender of workers.  
Table 1. Summary of Theoretical Predictions 
Dimension Privacy Concerns Payment Protection Job Choice 
Intensity Increasing intensity can increase 
privacy concerns because: 
• Workers become more concerned 
about their privacy being invaded 
(Gandy 1993)  
• Workers perceive a higher 
vulnerability (Martin et al. 2017) 
related to data misuse 
Increasing intensity can 
increase workers’ perceived 
payment protection because: 
• More information that can 
serve as proof of work gets 
recorded (Moore and 
Hayes 2018) 
• Increasing the intensity of 
monitoring decreases 
workers’ propensity to 
accept monitoring by 
increasing their privacy 
concerns 
• Increasing the intensity of 
monitoring increases 
workers’ propensity to 
accept monitoring by 
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increasing their perceived 
payment protection 
Transparency The impact of transparency on 
privacy concerns depends on the 
monitoring intensity. 
• When the intensity is low, 
transparency can alleviate 
privacy concerns because it can i) 
avoid unnecessary privacy 
concerns due to uncertainty and 
ii) increase the perceived 
procedural fairness of monitoring 
• When the intensity is high, 
transparency is not expected to 
alleviate privacy concerns 
because i) the transparent 
disclosure confirms workers’ 
concern about intense 
information collection and ii) 
transparency is not sufficient to 
justify the procedural fairness of 
intense monitoring 
The impact of transparency on 
perceived payment protection 
depends on the monitoring 
intensity. 
• When the intensity is high, 
transparency can assure 
workers that the collected 
information is sufficient to 
protect them from payment 
disputes 
• When the intensity is low, 
transparency need not 
increase the perceived 
payment protection as only 
limited information is 
recorded as potential 
evidence 
• When the monitoring 
intensity is low, being 
transparent about the 
monitoring policy 
increases workers’ 
propensity to accept 
monitoring by reducing 
their privacy concerns 
• When the monitoring 
intensity is high, being 
transparent about the 
monitoring policy 
increases workers’ 
propensity to accept 
monitoring by increasing 
their perceived payment 
protection 
Control Providing control can reduce privacy 
concerns because: 
• It allows workers to remove 
sensitive information 
• It increases the perceived 
procedural fairness of monitoring 
(Alge 2001, Culnan and 
Armstrong 1999) 
• Workers have a sense of 
autonomy (Martin et al. 2017) 
Providing control can reduce 
workers’ perceived payment 
protection because: 
• The removed information 
cannot be used as proof of 
work anymore 
• Employers may become 
more skeptical about the 
selective monitoring logs 
submitted by workers 
 
• The provision of control 
increases workers’ 
propensity to accept 
monitoring by reducing 
their privacy concerns 
• The provision of control 
decreases workers’ 
propensity to accept 
monitoring by reducing 
their perceived payment 
protection 
Gender Females may have stronger privacy 
concerns over monitoring than males 
because: 
• Females are more sensitive to 
potential privacy invasion (Hoy 
and Milne 2010, Rowan and 
Dehlinger 2014, Sheehan 1999) 
Females may have weaker privacy 
concerns over monitoring than males 
because: 
• Females are more willing to 
disclose information on online 
platforms (Hollenbaugh and 
Everett 2013, Sheehan 1999)  
• Females are more compliant 
(Sheehan 1999) 
Females may perceive 
stronger payment protection 
from monitoring than males 
because: 
• Females tend to be more 
risk averse (Croson and 
Gneezy 2009, Fellner and 
Maciejovsky 2007) 
Females are more likely to 
accept monitoring than males 
because: 
• Females are more willing 
to disclose information on 
online platforms 
(Hollenbaugh and Everett 
2013, Sheehan 1999)  
• Females are more 
compliant (Sheehan 1999) 







3. Experimental Design 
To answer our four research questions, we conduct two online experiments, one on AMT 
(https://www.mturk.com/) and one on Prolific (https://www.prolific.co/), using a realistic job screening 
process for an image-labeling task as the research context.11 Gig economy platforms like AMT and Prolific 
are ideal settings for this experiment, because the subjects are real gig workers who receive compatible 
incentives in a realistic scenario (Chen and Horton 2016); and this allows us to accurately estimate the 
WTA for monitoring within this setting. We post a job screening survey on AMT/Prolific so that workers 
interested in the image-labeling task can take this survey, in which we ask them to choose between a 
monitored and unmonitored image-labeling job at different wages. To investigate how workers’ acceptance 
of monitoring varies with the design of monitoring policy, we further manipulate the monitoring policy in 
multiple dimensions. Next, we elaborate on how we manipulate the monitoring policy and the wages of 
jobs, as well as the overall design of the experiment.   
3.1. Manipulation of Monitoring Policy 
We manipulate the intensity, transparency, and control of monitoring, and study how they affect 
workers’ perception and acceptance of monitoring. Ideally, we would consider a 2 (high vs. low intensity) 
× 2 (with vs. without transparency) × 2 (with vs. without control) full factorial design. However, some of 
the combinations are either infeasible or impractical. Specifically, when the intensity of monitoring is 
relatively low (e.g., only working hours are tracked), it is impractical to provide control over the limited 
information collected (e.g., removing tracked hours is typically not an option to workers). Moreover, since 
the monitoring policy is not disclosed to workers in the no transparency condition, the level of monitoring 
intensity and the availability of control simply cannot be manipulated. Therefore, we are left with four 
feasible monitoring conditions: no transparency, low intensity, high intensity (without control), and high 
intensity with control. Note that the latter three conditions presume transparency. 
To operationalize the four feasible monitoring conditions which are common in practice, we adopt a 
 
11 Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval was obtained before we ran the experiments. 
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between-subject discrete choice experimental design by randomly assigning workers into one of the four 
groups in our experiment: a) the no_disclosure group, in which workers are not informed how they will be 
monitored; b) the only_time group, in which workers’ working hours are tracked but no computer 
screenshots are taken; c) the controlled_screenshots group, in which both working hours and computer 
screenshots are recorded but workers have the option to remove some screenshots; and d) the 
all_screenshots groups, in which both working hours and computer screenshots are tracked and recorded 
screenshots cannot be removed. Table 2 shows these four groups as well as the exemplary firms, institutions, 
or third-party monitoring apps that adopt each type of monitoring policy. 
Table 2. Design of Monitoring Policy Manipulations 
 Without Control With Control 
With Transparency 
Low Intensity only_time  (e.g., AMT, Harvest Forecast) N/A 
High Intensity all_screenshots (e.g., Monitask, StaffCop) 
controlled_screenshots 
(e.g., Freelancer, Screenmeter) 
Without Transparency no_disclosure (e.g., Uber, Food and Drug Administration12) 
 
Before asking a worker to choose between a monitored and unmonitored job, we provide a tutorial 
about the monitoring system that will be used for the image-labeling job. Table 3 summarizes how we 
introduce the monitoring system to workers randomly assigned to each group. The screenshots of different 
versions of tutorials used in the experimental interface are provided in Appendix A. To ensure that workers 
fully understand how the monitoring system works, at the bottom of the tutorial page, we added a question 
with statements about the monitoring policies they are assigned to (e.g., “the monitoring app takes 
screenshots of your computer”) and ask the workers to choose all correct statements, except for workers in 
the no_disclosure group. Workers need to examine the correct answers before they can move to the next 
step. This step is designed to reduce the potential effect of any pre-existing misconception regarding how 







Table 3. Operationalization of Different Monitoring Policies 
Treatment Group Description of the Monitoring System 
no_disclosure None 
only_time  The monitoring system will only track how long the employee works for the 
project. But it will not take screenshots of the employee’s computer. 
controlled_screenshots The monitoring system will track how long the employee works for the project. 
Meanwhile, it will take screenshots of the employee’s computer at regular or 
irregular time intervals while s/he is working. To protect the privacy of the 
employee, the employee may delete a few screenshots s/he does not feel 
comfortable to upload. 
all_screenshots The monitoring system will track how long the employee works for the project. 
Meanwhile, it will take screenshots of the employee’s computer at regular or 
irregular time intervals while s/he is working. Once those screenshots are taken, 
the employee cannot delete any screenshots. 
 
3.2. Manipulation of Wage Premium  
Following prior work, we use a discrete choice experimental design to estimate workers’ WTA 
(Hedegaard and Tyran 2018, Martín-Fernández et al. 2010, Mas and Pallais 2017). Specifically, we ask 
workers to choose between a monitored and an unmonitored job with different wage premiums for the 
monitored job. Note that the monitoring policy for the monitored job is randomly assigned independent of 
the wage premium. Following the wage difference randomization approach of Mas and Pallais (2017), we 
fix the hourly wage for the higher paid job and randomize the wage premium for monitoring by varying the 
hourly wage assigned to the lower paid job. The fixed wage for the higher paid job is called the maximum 
hourly wage. Assuming that the maximum hourly wage is $10, to obtain a condition with a $2 ($-2) wage 
premium for monitoring, the hourly wages for the monitored and unmonitored jobs will be set to $10 ($8) 
and $8 ($10), respectively. We discuss the maximum hourly wages used in our experiments in Section 3.3. 
The wage premium for monitoring is randomly chosen from the range of $-2 to $5, at an interval of 
$0.5. To assess whether this range covers the WTAs of most workers, we conducted a pilot test on 280 
AMT workers. Among the 19 workers who were assigned to the condition with a $5 wage premium for 
monitoring,  all of them chose the monitored job, suggesting that the $5 wage premium is high enough to 
ensure that all workers are willing to accept monitoring. Among the 21 workers who received a wage 
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premium of $-2 for the monitored job, only one worker chose the monitored job. This finding suggests that 
$-2 is an appropriate lower bound for WTA for monitoring. We allow the wage premium to be negative 
since highly risk-averse workers may prefer monitored jobs over unmonitored jobs due to the payment 
protection of monitoring. Ruling out the existence of such workers a priori could possibly render the 
estimated WTA unrepresentative of the whole population of workers. 
Figure 1 provides an example of two job positions presented to a prospective worker, with a zero wage 
premium for the monitored job. The order of monitored and unmonitored jobs is randomized to reduce the 
potential anchoring effect of the first option (Strack and Mussweiler 1997). To ensure that workers 
accurately report their job preferences, we inform them that their job preferences over monitored or 
unmonitored jobs will not affect their chances of being hired. In addition, the job preference question is 
designed to be a text entry question, in which each worker has to type in the four-digit number of his/her 
preferred position, instead of a multi-choice question. This design can help reduce the number of inattentive 
responses (Mas and Pallais 2017). As an additional attention check, we further ask workers whether they 
have chosen a monitored job at the end of the survey. 
 
Figure 1. An Example of Job Preference Question in Study 1 
3.3. Overall Design 
3.3.1. Study 1: AMT 
We now discuss the overall design of our experiment. As shown in Figure 2, the job screening survey 
includes seven major steps. At the beginning of the survey, we collect the demographic information about 
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the prospective workers, including gender, race, education, work experience, whether they have been 
monitored at work before, and their average hourly wage from AMT. After that, we ask them to label a 
small sample of images and record their labeling speed and accuracy. The monitoring policy is manipulated 
in Step 3, in which workers are randomly shown one of the four versions of the monitoring system tutorials 
listed in Table 3. In Step 4, we ask workers to choose between a monitored job and an unmonitored job 
wherein the wage premium of the monitored job over the unmonitored job is randomly chosen from the 
range of −$2 to $5. Given that the median hourly wage of AMT workers is between $4~$5 (Adams and 
Berg 2017), we set the maximum hourly wage (i.e., the hourly wage for the higher paid job) to $9. This 
ensures that, when the wage premium for the monitored job is $5, the lower paid unmonitored job still 
receives $4 per hour. 
 
Figure 2. The Flow of the Experiment 
To investigate the mechanisms behind the job preference towards monitoring, we further ask workers 
to answer a few questions regarding their perceptions of the monitoring system (e.g., privacy concerns and 
perceived payment protection) in Step 5. The set of items used to measure privacy concerns are adapted 
from the “Global Information Privacy Concern Scale” (Malhotra et al. 2004). Please refer to Appendix B 
for more details. To measure workers’ perceived payment protection from monitoring, we ask workers to 
indicate to what extent they agree with the statement “Monitoring system can provide evidence of my effort” 
on a 7-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). 
Since the measurement of privacy concerns is highly sensitive to information cues (Acquisti et al. 
2017, John et al. 2010), it is possible that workers’ job choices in Step 4 may influence their reported privacy 
concerns in Step 5. To rule out the potential reverse causality between privacy concerns and job choices, 
we randomize the order of the job choice question and the privacy concern questions, which is known as a 
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counterbalance design for serial order effects (Brooks 2012). In other words, the privacy concern is 
measured before the job choice for half of the workers and after the job choice for the other half; this allows 
us to rule out the concern that our findings are an artifact of potential serial order effects.  
In Step 6, workers are asked to finish a general cognitive ability test composed of four questions from 
ACT Work Keys,13 a test commonly used to assess workers’ cognitive capability in the workplace. In the 
last step, we ask workers to report whether they chose a monitored/unmonitored job as an attention check. 
In Appendix A, we provide screenshots for each step of the experiment. 
The WTA for monitoring may vary across countries since workers in different economic and cultural 
environments may have very different perceptions of monitoring. In this study, we seek to measure the 
WTA of workers in the US. Therefore, we only allow workers from the US to participate in the survey. For 
quality control, we focus on workers who have finished more than 1,000 tasks on AMT and have an 
approval rate higher than 98%. Each worker can only take this survey once. Each worker receives $0.80 as 
compensation for completing the survey. 
Study 1 on AMT provides us evidence for how the three dimensions of monitoring policy affect job 
choice and the mechanisms underlying those choices. After conducting Study 1, we seek to evaluate the 
replicability and generalizability of the findings to other platforms. Further, according to the prior literature 
on monitoring and moral hazard (Duflo et al. 2012, Hubbard 2000), different monitoring policies may affect 
workers’ perception of how much effort is required to complete a monitored job, which may be a potential 
confounder. In Study 2, we seek to further investigate whether we find consistent results in a non-AMT 
platform after excluding the potential confounding effect of workers’ perceived effort requirement. 
3.3.2. Study 2: Prolific 
To replicate Study 1 and to establish the external validity of our findings, we conduct Study 2 on 





recommended by many scholars (e.g., Palan and Schitter 2018, Peer et al. 2017). As suggested by Peer et 
al. (2017), workers on Prolific tend to be more diverse, naïve, and honest than those on AMT.  
The design of Study 2 is similar to that of Study 1. Notably, however, to eliminate the concern that 
monitoring policies may affect workers’ perceived effort required to complete a job, as shown in Figure 3, 
this second experiment on Prolific focuses on image-labeling jobs paid by outcome (i.e., the number of 
correctly labeled images) rather than by working hours. To ensure that the estimated WTA for monitoring 
from Study 2 can also be interpreted based on hourly wages, the jobs in Study 2 are described in a way that 
is straightforward for workers to infer the effective hourly wages (e.g., the effective hourly wages of the 
two jobs in Figure 3 are both $10).  
 
Figure 3. An Example of Job Preference Question in Study 2 
We optimize a few aspects of the experimental design for Prolific. We first narrow the range of wage 
premium of the monitored job over the unmonitored job to be between -$1 to $5, after learning from the 
AMT experiment that a rather small share of respondents chose the monitored job when the wage premium 
for monitoring is negative. Further, given that the average hourly wage of Prolific workers is roughly $1 
higher than that of AMT workers, we increase the maximum hourly wage to $10. Moreover, since our 
counterbalance design pertaining to the order of the privacy concern questions and the job choice questions 
in Study 1 suggests that our findings are not sensitive to the order of these two questions, we drop the 
counterbalance design in Study 2 and consistently measure the privacy scale after the job choice question. 
Similar to Study 1, we focus on US workers who have finished more than 100 tasks on Prolific and have 
an approval rate higher than 98%.  
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We use the same set of questions as Study 1 to measure workers’ privacy concerns. However, since 
workers in Study 2 are paid by the number of correctly labeled images, rather than working hours or other 
proxies of efforts, we instead ask the workers to indicate to what extent they agree with the statement “If I 
am monitored while working on the job, the information recorded by the monitoring system may help me 
on a potential dispute” on a 7-point Likert scale. 
 4. Empirical Models 
4.1. Effects of Monitoring Policies on Job Preferences 
We use a linear regression model to identify workers’ trade-offs in selecting between a monitored job 
and an unmonitored job with different wage premiums and different monitoring policies (i.e., whether they 
choose the monitored jobs over the unmonitored ones). Equation (1) provides the estimation model on how 
the wage premium and monitoring policy affect workers’ decisions to accept monitoring (or not). 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖                   (1)                                                                  
Here, we use 𝑜𝑜 to index workers. The dependent variable 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 equals 1 if worker i chooses the 
monitored job, and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  denotes the monitoring policy for 
worker i and will be represented by a set of dummies. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 represents the demographic attributes of worker i, 
including gender, race, education, working experience, prior experience of working under monitoring, and 
average hourly wage on AMT/Prolific.  
The linear regression model given by Equation (1) is usually referred to as a linear probability model 
(LPM) in that the dependent variable is binary. In addition to the LPM, we also consider a probit model to 
account for the binary nature of the dependent variable. As we show next, the probit model also allows us 
to estimate the economic cost of monitoring (i.e., WTA for monitoring). 
4.2. WTA for Monitoring 
In this subsection, we show how workers’ WTA for monitoring can be estimated using a probit model. 
Given that workers’ WTA for monitoring may depend on various factors, without loss of generality, we 
formulate the WTA of worker i as 
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𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖                                                                       (2) 
where the random variable 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 represents the baseline WTA of worker i and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 represents the set of variables 
that may affect the worker’s WTA, including the monitoring policy assigned to worker i and demographic 
attributes of worker i. Following the convention in measuring WTA/WTP (Mas and Pallais 2017), we do 
not restrict 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 to be positive and assume that 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 follows a normal distribution with mean 𝜇𝜇 and variance 
𝜎𝜎. In the case when 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 needs to be nonnegative, we can use the following specification instead: 
                                                 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = exp(𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖)                                                                  (3) 
A worker chooses the monitored job when the wage premium for the monitored job exceeds his/her 
WTA for monitoring. Given that the WTA is a random variable, the probability that worker i chooses the 
monitored job is given by: 
      𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Pr (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 > 0)                                      (4) 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 is given by Equation (2), or Equation (3) when nonnegativity of WTA is desired. Following 
the distributional assumption on 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 (i.e., 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎2)), 
𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Pr(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 > 0)  
= 𝛷𝛷 �𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎
�                                                           (5) 




, 𝛽𝛽2 = −𝛾𝛾𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽0 = −𝜇𝜇𝛽𝛽1, we have: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛷𝛷(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)                                  (6)   
The set of parameters {𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2} in Equation (6) can be estimated using a probit model, from which 
we can infer {𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎, 𝛾𝛾}. The latter set of parameters characterize workers’ WTA for monitoring. Therefore, 
the above results suggest that we can infer the WTA for monitoring by estimating how the wage premium, 
monitoring policy, and demographic attributes affect workers’ job choices.  
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5. Data and Results 
5.1. Data Description 
Our experiments on AMT and Prolific obtained 1,895 and 1,882 responses, respectively, after some 
data cleaning. 14  Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of workers’ job choices, the treatment 
variables (i.e., monitoring policy dummies), the wage premium, the privacy concerns of workers, the 
perceived payment protection from monitoring, and several key demographic attributes of workers.  
Table 4. Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Definition 
AMT Prolific 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
choice Dummy variable, =1 if the monitored job is 
chosen by the worker 
0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
no_disclosure Dummy variable, =1 if the data collection 
policy of the monitoring system is not 
disclosed 
0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
only_time Dummy variable, =1 if the monitoring 
system only tracks time  
0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
controlled_screenshots Dummy variable, =1 if the monitoring 
system tracks time and selective screenshots 
that workers are comfortable of sharing  
0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
all_screenshtos Dummy variable, =1 if the monitoring 
system tracks time and all screenshots 
0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
male Dummy variable, =1 if the worker is male 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
wage_premium The wage premium of the monitored job 
over the unmonitored job 
1.49 2.16 -2.00 5.00 1.94 1.82 -1.00 5.00 
monitor_experience Dummy variable, =1 if the worker has some 
experience of being monitored in his/her job 
0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 
gig_hourlywage The average hourly wage when working on 
AMT/Prolific 
4.83 2.82 0.60 15.00 5.61 3.08 0.00 15.00 
privacy The average score in the privacy concern 
scale (measured on a 7-point Likert scale) 
4.83 1.43 1.00 7.00 4.98 1.38 1.00 7.00 
protection To what extent the worker agrees that 
monitoring can provide payment protection 
(measured on a 7-point Likert scale) 
5.50 0.50 1.00 7.00 5.25 0.50 1.00 7.00 
Note: As shown in Appendix C, the demographic distribution of AMT workers recruited by us closely resembles 
that of the AMT worker population in the US. Randomization checks and the number of observations in each 
experiment group are provided in Appendix D. 
 
 
14 We removed incomplete responses, duplicated responses from the same IP addresses, responses from non-English 
speakers, responses from workers whose self-reported hourly wages were less than $0.5/hr (unlikely for US 
workers), and responses with zero image-labeling time. 
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Figure 4 shows how the percentage of workers choosing the monitored job varies with the wage 
premium of the monitored job under different monitoring policies on the two gig economy platforms. 
         
(a) AMT                                                                                     (b) Prolific 
Figure 4.  Model-free Evidence on the Impact of Monitoring Policy on Job Choices 
As shown in Figures 4a and 4b, when the wage premium for the monitored job is negative, only a very 
small proportion of workers are willing to be monitored, indicating few workers value payment protection 
more than privacy concerns. When the wage premium for the monitored job is zero, roughly 10% of workers 
chose the monitored job on both AMT and Prolific. These workers have below average privacy concerns 
but perceive above average payment protection from monitoring, suggesting that they value payment 
protection more than privacy. As the wage premium for the monitored job further increases, the percentage 
of workers choosing monitored jobs increases quickly, with 73% (65%) of AMT (Prolific) workers 
choosing the monitored job at a wage premium of $2/hr.  
5.2. Treatment Effects 
To examine the effects of intensity, transparency, and control on acceptance of monitoring, we contrast 
the four monitoring groups on different dimensions. Specifically, to understand the effect of intensity, we 
compare the only_time group that only tracks hours with the all_screenshots group that further takes 
screenshots. We do not consider the controlled_screenshots group in this comparison because this group 
also involves control. In addition, to study the effect of transparency under different monitoring intensities, 
we compare the no_disclosure group with two groups with transparent disclosure of monitoring policy at 
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of control, we compare the controlled_screenshots group with the all_screenshots group. The only 
difference between these two groups is that the former gives users control over the monitored information. 
Table 5 summarizes our strategy to estimate the effects of different dimensions of monitoring policies. 
Table 5. Monitoring Groups Used to Estimate the Effects of Intensity, Transparency, and Control 
Dimension of Monitoring Groups Used for Comparison 
Intensity only_time vs. all_screenshots 
Transparency 
no_disclosure vs. only_time (low intensity) 
no_disclosure vs. all_screenshots (high intensity) 
Control all_screenshots vs. controlled_screenshots 
 
Next, we estimate the impact of each dimension of monitoring policy on workers’ job choices using 
the LPM model given by Equation (1). When estimating the effect of each dimension, we remove the 
group(s) that are not used for comparison and set the left-hand side group in the second column of Table 5 
as the baseline group for the regression analysis, that is, only_time, no_disclosure, and all_screenshots are 
the baseline groups for the intensity, transparency, and control dimensions, respectively.  
5.2.1. Intensity 
To investigate the effect of intensity on workers’ acceptance of monitoring, we focus on workers in 
the only_time vs. all_screenshots groups, using the former as the reference group as it is the monitoring 
policy employed by common gig platforms such as AMT and Prolific. The estimates of the LPM, as 
specified in Equation (1), are reported in Table 6 for both the AMT and Prolific samples. Since the findings 
on both samples are highly consistent, our following discussion will primarily focus on the AMT sample.  
As shown in Column 1 of Table 6, as expected, workers are more willing to choose the monitored job 
as the wage premium increases. Moreover, all else equal, workers in the all_screenshots group are 
significantly less likely to choose the monitored job than those in the only_time group, suggesting that 
workers are less likely to choose monitored jobs as the intensity of monitoring increases. The effect of 
intensity on acceptance of monitoring is not only statistically significant, but also economically significant. 
Taking the AMT sample as an example, when working hours are tracked, further taking computer 
screenshots decreases the probability of workers to choose the monitored job by 6.3%, which is equivalent 
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to the effect of a $0.42/hr decrease in the wage premium for the monitored job (−0.063 / 0.150 = −0.42, 
where −0.063 and 0.150 are the coefficients of all_screenshots and wage_premium in Column 1 of Table 
6). Similarly, in the Prolific sample, the effect of taking computer screenshots translates to a $0.47/hr 
decrease in the wage premium for the monitored job (−0.070 / 0.148 = −0.47).  
Table 6. Effects of Intensity on Perception and Acceptance of Monitoring 
 AMT Prolific  
 Choice  Privacy  Protection  Choice Choice Privacy  Protection  Choice 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
all_screenshots  -0.063**  0.187**  0.119  -0.053**  -0.070***  0.197**  0.065  -0.052**  
 (0.025)  (0.093)  (0.089)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.091)  (0.087)  (0.024)  
male  -0.071***  0.268***  -0.110  -0.044*  -0.072***  0.116  -0.174**  -0.050**  
 (0.025)  (0.094)  (0.090)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.092)  (0.087)  (0.024)  
wage_premium  0.150***  -0.081***  0.023  0.142***  0.148***  -0.028  0.024  0.144***  
 (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.007)  
privacy    -0.084***     -0.111***  
    (0.008)     (0.009)  
protection    0.042***     0.053***  
    (0.009)     (0.009)  
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations  966  966  966  966  941  941  941  941  
R2  0.445  0.080  0.052  0.527  0.342  0.041  0.041  0.469  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The reference group is only_time. The control variables include workers’ 
education, race, working experience, average hourly wage on the platform, prior experience with monitoring, and 
whether the job choice was made before measuring privacy concerns (AMT only). The results are similar when we 
do not include any worker-level control variables or when we use probit instead of LPM models for workers’ job 
choices. 
 
To delve into the mechanisms behind the treatment effect of intensity, we examine how intensity 
influences workers’ privacy concerns and perceived payment protection. To that end, we estimate two LPM 
models similar to Equation (1), except that we replace the dependent variable with workers’ privacy 
concerns and perceived payment protection, respectively. The results of these two models are reported in 
Columns 2-3 of Table 6 for the AMT sample and Columns 6-7 for the Prolific sample. The coefficients of 
all_screenshots in these columns suggest that increasing intensity significantly increases workers’ privacy 
concerns but not their perceived payment protection. This finding is consistent with our argument that 
privacy concerns increase with intensity, but does not support the expectation that workers’ perceived 
payment protection increases with intensity.  
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To investigate whether privacy concerns and perceived payment protection mediate the effects of 
monitoring policies on workers’ acceptance of monitoring as discussed in Section 2, we further estimate a 
LPM that controls for workers’ privacy concerns and perceived payment protection. The results of this 
model on the AMT and Prolific samples are reported in Columns 4 and 8 of Table 6, respectively. In line 
with our expectation, we find that privacy concerns have a negative effect on the acceptance of monitoring, 
whereas perceived payment protection has a positive effect. To better understand the mediation roles of 
privacy concerns and payment protection, we estimate their mediation effects using a bias-corrected 
bootstrapping approach (Hayes and Scharkow 2013). The mediation effects of these two variables are 
reported in Table 7. The results suggest that only privacy concerns play a statistically significant mediation 
role. The mediation effect of payment protection is not significant likely because the effect of intensity on 
payment protection is not significant in Columns 3 and 7 of Table 6. 
Table 7. Mediation Analysis on Intensity 
 
AMT Prolific 
Estimate Bootstrap SE p-value Estimate Bootstrap SE p-value 
mediation effect through privacy -0.015 0.008 0.050 -0.022 0.010 0.032 
mediation effect through protection 0.005 0.004 0.249 0.003 0.005 0.468 
 
5.2.2. Transparency   
As indicated in Table 5, to estimate the effect of transparency on workers’ perception and acceptance 
of monitoring, we focus on workers in three groups: no_disclosure, only_time, and all_screenshots. We use 
the no_disclosure as the reference group, as the other two groups both presume transparent disclosure of 
monitoring policy. The regression results on the transparency dimension are summarized in Table 8, which 
are structured in a similar way as the results on the intensity dimension. The positive and significant 
coefficient of only_time in Columns 1 and 5 of Table 8 suggests that when the monitoring intensity is low, 
disclosing the monitoring policy transparently can increase workers’ propensity to choose monitored jobs. 
However, the insignificant coefficient of all_screenshots in these two columns suggests that transparent 
disclosure is not helpful in increasing the propensity of choosing monitored jobs when the monitoring 
intensity is high. These findings confirm our arguments in Section 2 that transparency increases the 
28 
 
acceptance of monitoring only when the monitoring intensity is low. Our study shows that the effectiveness 
of transparency is nuanced, contingent on monitoring intensity, which extends prior studies that show the 
general desirability of the transparency of companies’ data practices and information policies to workers 
(Acquisti et al. 2015, Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993). 
Table 8. Effects of Transparency on Job Preferences 
 AMT Prolific  
 Choice Privacy  Protection  Choice Choice Privacy  Protection  Choice 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
only_time 0.071***  -0.280***  0.060  0.042*  0.070***  -0.239***  0.203**  0.035  
 (0.025)  (0.093)  (0.088)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.089)  (0.087)  (0.024)  
all_screenshots 0.010  -0.097  0.184**  -0.007  0.002  -0.050  0.268***  -0.017  
 (0.025)  (0.093)  (0.088)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.090)  (0.088)  (0.024)  
male  -0.056***  0.193**  -0.175**  -0.030  -0.095***  0.084  -0.151**  -0.079***  
 (0.021)  (0.076)  (0.073)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.074)  (0.072)  (0.020)  
wage_premium  0.148***  -0.077***  0.035**  0.140***  0.151***  -0.052***  0.022  0.144***  
 (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.005)  
privacy    -0.093***     -0.107***  
    (0.007)     (0.007)  
protection    0.043***     0.049***  
    (0.007)     (0.008)  
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  1,422  1,422  1,422  1,422  1,407  1,407  1,407  1,407  
R2  0.434  0.070  0.056  0.528  0.350  0.038  0.033  0.463  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The reference group is no_disclosure. The control variables include workers’ 
education, race, working experience, average hourly wage on the platform, prior experience with monitoring, and 
whether the job choice was made before measuring privacy concerns (AMT only). The results are similar when we 
do not include any worker-level control variables or when we use probit instead of LPM models for workers’ job 
choices. 
 
The coefficients of only_time and all_screenshots in Columns 2 and 6 show that transparent disclosure 
significantly lowers privacy concerns when the monitoring intensity is low, but not when the intensity is 
high. This finding confirms our earlier arguments that transparency is effective in alleviating privacy 
concerns only when the monitoring intensity is low. In addition, the significant and positive coefficients of 
all_screenshots in Columns 3 and 7 suggest that, when the monitoring intensity is high, being transparent 
can increase workers’ perceived payment protection. Nevertheless, when the monitoring intensity is low, 
the effects of transparency on perceived payment protection are mixed on AMT (insignificant) and Prolific 
(significant). Overall, the differential effects of transparency on the perception and acceptance of 
monitoring under low and high monitoring intensities are consistent with our expectations. 
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Table 9 reports the estimated mediation effects of privacy concerns and payment protection with 
bootstrapped standard errors. When the monitoring intensity is low, transparency significantly increases 
workers’ propensity to choose monitored jobs by lowering their privacy concerns. Meanwhile, when the 
monitoring intensity is high, transparency (marginally) significantly increases workers’ propensity to 
choose monitored jobs by increasing their perceived payment protection. These two mediation patterns 
demonstrate that the effects of transparency on workers’ acceptance of monitoring are governed by different 
mechanisms for low and high intensity monitoring, as summarized in Table 1.  











Low intensity mediation effect through privacy -0.022 0.008 0.008 -0.025 0.009 0.007 
mediation effect through protection -0.003 0.004 0.467 -0.011 0.005 0.032 
High intensity mediation effect through privacy -0.012 0.010 0.232 -0.007 0.010 0.491 
mediation effect through protection -0.006 0.003 0.079 -0.011 0.004 0.009 
 
The mediation analyses in Tables 7 and 9 show that the mediation effect of privacy concerns is 
generally much larger than that of payment protection. As shown in Table 4, the variation in privacy 
concerns is also much larger than that in payment protection. Together, these findings suggest that that 
privacy concerns may play a more pronounced mediation role than payment protection in influencing 
workers’ job choices. In other words, workers’ job choice decisions are primarily driven by privacy 
concerns, rather than perceived payment protection. This explains why transparency does not affect workers’ 
job choices when the monitoring intensity is high, even though it significantly increases workers’ perceived 
payment protection. 
5.2.3. Control   
To examine the effect of providing control on workers’ perception and acceptance of monitoring, we 
focus on the all_screenshots and controlled_screenshots groups. We use the all_screenshots group that 
does not offer control as the reference group. Table 10 summarizes the effects of control on workers’ 
perception and acceptance of monitoring. Surprisingly, while there are many reasons to believe that 
providing control over monitored information can lower workers’ privacy concerns (e.g., the ability to 
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remove sensitive information, the sense of autonomy, and the perceived procedural fairness), the estimated 
effect is not significant on either platform. One likely reason for this null finding is that the option to remove 
sensitive screenshots also reminds workers that the monitoring system may collect sensitive information, 
which is also known as the cueing effect (Acquisti et al. 2017, John et al. 2010). The cueing effect may 
have canceled out the negative effect of control on privacy concerns. 
The coefficients of controlled_screenshots in Columns 3 and 6 show that the provision of control has 
no significant effect on workers’ perceived payment protection either. This finding is not particularly 
surprising as the provision of control does not deprive workers’ rights to retain relevant information that 
can help them in potential payment disputes. Given that the provision of control has no significant effects 
on either privacy concerns or payment protection, it is not difficult to understand why the effect of control 
on workers’ job choices is also not significant.     
Table 10. Effects of Control on Perception and Acceptance of Monitoring 
 AMT   Prolific   
 Choice  Privacy  Protection  Choice Privacy  Protection  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)   
controlled_screenshots  0.005  0.088  -0.123  0.033  -0.086  -0.101  
 (0.026)  (0.091)  (0.088)  (0.027)  (0.091)  (0.087)         
male -0.054**  0.125  -0.123  -0.076***  0.264***  -0.245***  
 (0.026)  (0.091)  (0.088)  (0.027)  (0.092)  (0.088)         
price_monitoring  0.136***  -0.022  0.017  0.152***  -0.065***  -0.016  
 (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.007)  (0.025)  (0.024)          
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  948  948  948  941  941  941  
R2  0.377  0.074  0.055  0.334  0.058  0.036  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The reference group is all_screenshots. The control variables include workers’ 
education, race, working experience, average hourly wage on the platform, prior experience with monitoring, and 
whether the job choice was made before measuring privacy concerns (AMT only). The results are similar when we 
do not include any worker-level control variables or when we use probit instead of LPM models for workers’ job 
choices. 
 
5.2.4. Comparison of Monitoring Policies 
To facilitate the comparison of different monitoring policies, Figure 5 visualizes the predicted 
probabilities for a worker with average characteristics to choose the monitored job at an average wage 
premium under different monitoring policies. Since we use a linear model, the difference in the predicted 
probabilities for any two groups is the same as the difference in average treatment effects (ATEs) of the 
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two groups. A higher predicted probability to choose the monitored job indicates a higher level of 
acceptance over a particular monitoring policy. Figure 5 shows that workers’ relative acceptance levels of 
different monitoring policies are consistent across the two gig platforms AMT and Prolific. In addition to 
estimating the effect of monitoring policy dimension-by-dimension as summarized in Table 5, we have also 
estimated the effects of different monitoring policies using a full sample analysis on all four monitoring 
policies. This analysis yields identical findings, and the detailed results are reported in Appendix E.  
   
Figure 5.  Predicted Probability to Choose the Monitored Job by Monitoring Policy 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
5.3. Gender Differences 
To examine the gender differences in workers’ perception and acceptance of monitoring, we conducted 
several additional analyses as reported in Table 11. On average, males are less likely to accept monitoring 
than females on both AMT and Prolific. The gender difference in acceptance of monitoring is aligned with 
the gender differences in privacy concerns and perceived payment protection. Specifically, we find that 
males report a higher level of privacy concerns than females, which is consistent with males’ stronger 
intention to protect their privacy than females when making actual decisions pertaining to privacy 
(Hollenbaugh and Everett 2013, Sheehan 1999, Denniston et al. 2010). In addition, we find that females 
perceive a higher level of payment protection from monitoring than males, which is consistent with the 
prior findings that females are more risk-averse than males (Croson and Gneezy 2009, Fellner and 
Maciejovsky 2007). The lower privacy concerns and higher payment protection reported by females well 
explain why females are more willing to choose monitored jobs than males.  
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Table 11. Gender Difference in Perception and Acceptance of Monitoring 
 AMT Prolific  
 Choice  Privacy  Protection  Choice Privacy  Protection  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
male  -0.036* 0.113* -0.124** -0.084*** 0.132** -0.176*** 
 (0.018) (0.066) (0.063) (0.019) (0.063) (0.062) 
no_disclosure -0.068*** 0.275*** -0.076 -0.069*** 0.244*** -0.200** 
 (0.025) (0.092) (0.088) (0.027) (0.089) (0.087) 
controlled_screenshots -0.050** 0.265*** -0.016 -0.039 0.091 -0.046 
 (0.025) (0.091) (0.087) (0.027) (0.089) (0.087) 
all_screenshots  -0.060** 0.196** 0.111 -0.069*** 0.188** 0.061 
 (0.025) (0.091) (0.086) (0.027) (0.089) (0.087) 
wage_premium  0.144*** -0.054*** 0.024* 0.153*** -0.061*** 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1,895 1,895 1,895 1,882 1,882 1,882 
R2  0.408 0.053 0.048 0.337 0.037 0.025 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The reference group is only_time. The control variables include workers’ 
education, race, working experience, average hourly wage on the platform, prior experience with monitoring, and 
whether the job choice was made before measuring privacy concerns (AMT only). The results are similar when we 
do not include any worker-level control variables or when we use probit instead of LPM models for workers’ job 
choices. 
5.4. WTA for Monitoring 
To help employers make more informed decisions regarding whether they should adopt monitoring 
and which monitoring policy to use, it is important to estimate the economic cost of monitoring, namely, 
workers’ WTA for monitoring. We estimate workers’ WTA for monitoring based on the identification 
strategy discussed in Section 4.2. We report the WTA for each type of monitoring policy, as well as its 
bootstrap confidence interval, in Table 12.  
On average, the WTA for monitoring for the four monitoring policies is $1.8/hr for AMT workers and 
$1.6/hr for Prolific workers, which respectively amount to 37.3% and 28.5% of their average hourly wages 
($4.8 for AMT workers and $5.6 for Prolific workers). Consistent with the earlier findings that lowering 
intensity and increasing transparency (when the intensity is low) can both increase workers’ acceptance of 
monitoring, workers’ WTA is the lowest for the only_time monitoring policy, which has a low intensity 
and a high transparency. This finding explains why many popular gig economy platforms (e.g., AMT and 




Table 12. WTA for Monitoring 
Sample: AMT Average WTA WTA due to privacy concerns WTA due to payment protection 
only_time 1.47 (1.20, 1.73) 3.91 (3.43, 4.39) -2.17 (-2.80, -1.57) 
no_disclosure 1.99 (1.70, 2.29) 4.08 (3.58, 4.59) -2.15 (-2.78, -1.55) 
controlled_screenshots 1.91 (1.62, 2.20) 4.10 (3.60, 4.61) -2.15 (-2.78, -1.55) 
all_screenshots 2.01 (1.75, 2.28) 4.05 (3.55, 4.55) -2.20 (-2.85, -1.59) 
Sample: Prolific Average WTA WTA due to privacy concerns WTA due to payment protection 
only_time 1.29 (1.00, 1.58) 4.01 (3.45, 4.61) -2.47 (-3.03, -1.94) 
no_disclosure 1.78 (1.49, 2.06) 4.21 (3.62, 4.84) -2.38 (-2.92, -1.87) 
controlled_screenshots 1.57 (1.29, 1.84) 4.10 (3.52, 4.71) -2.45 (-3.00, -1.92) 
all_screenshots 1.82 (1.56, 2.12) 4.19 (3.60, 4.81) -2.50 (-3.07, -1.96) 
Note: 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 bootstraps are reported in parentheses. Workers’ WTA due to payment 
protection is negative, implying that payment protection has a positive value for workers. For each monitoring policy, 
the sums of the values in Columns 2 and 3 are slightly different from the value in Column 1. Such differences represent 
the portion of WTA that cannot be explained by privacy concerns or payment protection.  
 
The WTA of workers in the no_disclosure group is significantly higher than that of workers in the 
only_time group, but not significantly different from those of workers in the controlled_screenshots and 
all_screenshots groups. Thus, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that improving transparency can 
lower the resistance to monitoring (Culnan and Armstrong 1999, Karwatzki et al. 2017), we find that 
transparent disclosure is not helpful when the monitoring intensity is high, though it is still beneficial when 
the monitoring intensity is low.  
Moreover, workers’ WTA in the no_disclosure group is closest to that in the all_screenshots group on 
both AMT and Prolific. One potential explanation is that workers tend to assume the worst when they face 
ambiguity or uncertainty (Friedland 1982). To verify whether this explanation is plausible, at the end of the 
experiment in Study 2, we ask workers in the no_disclosure group how they think they would be monitored 
if they chose the monitored job. Over 50% (80%) of them expected their screenshots (working hours) to be 
recorded, which suggests that the majority of workers assumed the monitoring to be intense in the absence 
of transparency. Therefore, employers are encouraged to be more transparent about the monitoring policy 
when the intensity is low.  
We further estimate workers’ WTAs for monitoring due to privacy concerns and perceived payment 
protection, by adding the privacy concerns and payment protection as two extra regressors in Equation (2). 
For workers in each group, we examine how much their average perceived privacy concern (payment 
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protection) differs from a benchmark, i.e., the lowest possible privacy concern (payment protection),15 and 
then calculate the change in WTA due to the difference in privacy concerns (payment protection). The 
WTAs due to privacy concerns (payment protection) for different groups are reported in the second (third) 
column of Table 12, with 95% confidence intervals obtained using 1,000 bootstrap estimates. Workers’ 
WTA due to privacy concerns is the lowest in the only_time group, in line with the lowest privacy concern 
of workers in this group. On the other hand, we find that AMT (Prolific) workers are willing to be paid 
2.1~2.2 (2.3~2.5) dollars less per hour in exchange for the payment protection from monitoring. The WTA 
due to payment protection is the highest for workers in the all_screenshots group, which is not surprising 
given that this monitoring policy records more information than other groups.  
In line with the finding that females are more likely to choose monitored jobs than males, we find that 
females have lower WTA for monitoring than males. Among workers on AMT (Prolific), the average 
WTAs for monitoring are $1.74/hr ($1.42/hr) for females and $1.97/hr ($1.86/hr) for males. 
5.5. Robustness Checks 
We conduct a series of robustness checks for our analyses. Due to page limits, we report the results of 
these analyses in the Appendices. First, to rule out the possibility that our findings are driven by inattentive 
responses, we estimate models that explicitly account for inattention and find that the results are consistent 
(Appendix F). Second, to rule out the potential reverse causality between job choices and privacy concerns, 
we run a subsample analysis on workers whose privacy concerns are measured before their job choices and 
find a consistent mediation pattern (Appendix G). Third, we show that results are consistent when we use 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to construct the measure for privacy concerns (Appendix H). 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Due to the challenge of quantifying the hidden cost of workers’ resistance to monitoring, employers 
may overestimate the benefit of monitoring by primarily focusing on the improvement in worker 
 
15  The benchmark can be interpreted as the perceived privacy concern (payment protection) in the absence of 
monitoring. For simplicity, we assume that the perceived privacy concern (payment protection) without monitoring is 
the lowest possible value, which is 1 on a seven-point Likert scale. Note that the choice of the benchmark value does 
not affect the difference in WTA due to privacy concern (payment protection) across groups. 
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productivity. To help employers make more informed decisions about whether to adopt monitoring and 
what monitoring policy to use, we make a first attempt to comprehensively investigate how different 
monitoring policies affect workers’ perception and acceptance of monitoring, as well as to quantify the 
economic cost of monitoring (i.e., WTA for monitoring), through online experiments on two gig economy 
platforms (AMT and Prolific).  
We consider four monitoring policies that differ in intensity, transparency, and control, which 
represent three common aspects in industry practices that are respectively aligned with the three common 
practices to alleviate workers’ privacy concerns and lower their resistance against monitoring. We find that, 
as the monitoring intensity increases, workers become less likely to accept monitored jobs due to elevated 
privacy concerns. Furthermore, we find that transparent disclosure of monitoring policy can increase 
workers’ willingness to accept monitored jobs, but only when the monitoring intensity is low. When the 
monitoring intensity is high, while transparency can increase workers’ perceived level of payment 
protection, it does not significantly reduce workers’ privacy concerns or increase workers’ propensity to 
choose monitored jobs. Interestingly, providing control over monitored information, a policy designed to 
address workers’ concerns over the sharing of sensitive information, is not effective in reducing workers’ 
privacy concerns over high-intensity monitoring. As a result, providing control has no significant effect on 
workers’ propensity to choose monitored jobs. Finally, we observe a nuanced gender difference in the 
perception and acceptance of monitoring. Specifically, compared with male workers, females sense stronger 
payment protection from monitoring and yet have lower privacy concerns over monitoring, rendering them 
more willing to choose monitored jobs than males.  
Our findings have important managerial implications. First, implementing monitoring can add a 
nonnegligible cost for labor recruitment. On average, the hourly wage compensation required for gig 
workers to accept monitoring is 1.6~1.8 dollars, which amounts to roughly 28.5%~37.3% of their average 
hourly wage. Therefore, when deciding whether to deploy employee monitoring, employers should take 
this cost into account. Second, the economic cost associated with monitoring depends on the monitoring 
policy (i.e., the intensity of monitoring, the transparency of the monitoring policy, and workers’ control 
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over the monitored records) and the gender composition of gig workers. Finally, employers should carefully 
weigh these factors when designing a monitoring policy. Our results suggest that 1) increasing the 
monitoring intensity increases workers’ resistance against monitoring; 2) improving transparency is an 
effective strategy to reduce gig workers’ resistance against monitoring, but only when the monitoring 
intensity is low; 3) while the provision of control is strongly advocated by both researchers and practitioners, 
we do not find it to be useful in reducing gig workers’ resistance against monitoring; and 4) to reduce 
workers’ resistance against monitoring, employers should place a stronger emphasis on monitoring policies 
that alleviate workers’ privacy concerns, compared to those that increase workers’ perceived payment 
protection, as workers’ decisions seem to be primarily driven by privacy concerns. 
This work has several limitations, which open up opportunities for ample future research. Our study 
focuses on the monitoring of gig workers. Regular employees in the traditional workplace may react to 
monitoring differently. On the one hand, they might be more willing to put up with monitoring than gig 
workers as more is at stake. On the other hand, they are generally less wage-sensitive than gig workers and 
hence may be less tolerant of monitoring. Investigating the differences between gig workers and regular 
employees, in terms of their perception and acceptance of monitoring, can be a promising future direction. 
Moreover, our online experiment is conducted in the image-labeling context, wherein it is relatively easy 
to monitor workers. Future research can investigate the effect of monitoring policy on other types of more 
sophisticated jobs such as software development and jobs that involves creative processes such as graphics 
design and writing. In addition, the mediators measured in our experiments can be endogenous due to 
unobserved confounders, meaning that our estimated mediation effects may not be causal. However, it 
should be noted that the estimated effects of monitoring policies on workers’ perception and acceptance of 
monitoring still have causal interpretations. Finally, there are new advances in monitoring technologies that 
are not fully reflected in the design of the two experiments reported in this study. For instance, Upwork 
recently started allowing employers to use webcams to monitor workers, in addition to tracking hours and 
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Supplementary Online Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Screenshots of the Flow of the Experiment 









Step 2: Image-labeling Test 
 





Step 3: Monitoring Policy 
Figures A3-A6 show the descriptions of the monitoring system for workers assigned to different 
monitoring policy groups.  
 
Figure A3. Tutorial for the no_disclosure group 
 
 


































Step 4: Job Choice 
Figures A7 and A8 are two screenshots of the job preference questions presented to prospective 
workers in Study 2 (i.e., the Prolific experiment), with a $1 and $-1 wage premium for the monitored job, 
respectively. 
 
Figure A7. A Job Preference Question with a $1 Wage Premium for the Monitored Job 
 
 




Step 5: Perception of Monitoring 
Figure A9 shows the scale used to measure privacy concerns in both Study 1 and Study 2. Please refer 
to Appendix B for more details on the design and reliability of this scale. 
 





Figures A10 and A11 represent the questions used to measure workers’ perceived payment protection 
from monitoring in Study 1 and Study 2, respectively. We changed the wording of the question in Study 2 
as workers are paid by the number of correctly labeled images, rather than working hours or other proxies 
of efforts. 
 




Figure A11. Payment Protection Question in Study 2 (Prolific)  
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Step 6: ACT Test 
 












Step 7: Attention Check 
  




Appendix B. Measurement of Privacy Concerns  
We use the following six questions adapted from the “Global Information Privacy Concern Scale” 
(Malhotra et al. 2004) to measure the privacy concerns of workers: 
1) All things considered, the monitoring system would cause serious privacy problems. 
2) Compared to others, I am more sensitive about the way the monitoring system handles my personal 
information. 
3) To me, the most important thing is to keep my privacy intact from the monitoring system. 
4) I believe other people are too much concerned with online privacy issues with the usage of the 
monitoring system. 
5) Compared with other issues in my mind, personal privacy is very important. 
6) I am concerned about threats to my personal privacy while being monitored. 
We use the Stata command alpha to analyze the reliability of our privacy concern scale. The reliability 
analysis results on the AMT and Prolific samples are highly consistent and are summarized in Tables B1 
and B2, respectively. The item-rest correlation, i.e., the correlation between a given item (i.e., question) 
and the scale formed by all the other items (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994), is the lowest for item 4. 
Additionally, Cronbach’s alpha is the highest after removing item 4. Therefore, we exclude item 4 and use 
the average of the rest five items as the measured level of privacy concerns. Note that our results are 
consistent if we keep item 4 while computing the average. 
Table B1. Reliability of the Privacy Concern Scale on AMT 
Item Obs Sign Item-rest correlation Alpha without the row item 
privacy_1 1895 + 0.689 0.858 
privacy_2 1895 + 0.770 0.844 
privacy_3 1895 + 0.783 0.842 
privacy_4 (reverse) 1895 + 0.412 0.902 
privacy_5 1895 + 0.670 0.861 
privacy_6 1895 + 0.817 0.836 




Table B2. Reliability of the Privacy Concern Scale on Prolific 
Item Obs Sign Item-rest correlation Alpha without the row item 
privacy_1 1882 + 0.669 0.856 
privacy_2 1882 + 0.764 0.840 
privacy_3 1882 + 0.732 0.845 
privacy_4 (reverse) 1882 + 0.485 0.886 
privacy_5 1882 + 0.646 0.860 
privacy_6 1882 + 0.793 0.835 





Appendix C. Representativeness of Workers 
In order to examine whether the AMT workers recruited by us are representative of the overall AMT 
worker population, we use the API provided by Difallah et al. (2018) to collect the overall demographic 
information of AMT workers from Jan 1st, 2018 to April 1st, 2018. Table C1 compares the demographics 
of AMT workers in our experiment with those in the US. The demographics of AMT workers in our 
experiment are similar to those of the AMT workers in the US. The comparison is not feasible for the 
recruited Prolific workers, since we are not aware of a similar API to collect the overall demographic 
information of Prolific workers. 
Table C1. Comparison of Recruited AMT Workers with AMT Population 
  AMT Workers  
in this Experiment 
AMT Workers  
in the US 
  (1) (2) 
Gender Female 55.94% 53.35% 
Education Less than high school 0.37% 0.75% 
 High school diploma or equivalent 9.02% 10.57% 
 Some college, no degree 22.33% 27.50% 
 Associate’s degree 11.61% 12.12% 
 Bachelor’s degree 42.32% 36.13% 
 Master’s degree 12.35% 10.61% 
 Doctoral or professional degree 2.01% 2.31% 
Race Asian or Asian American 7.34% -- 
 Black or African American 8.50% -- 
 Hispanic or Latino 6.86% -- 
 White 74.56% -- 
 other 2.75% -- 
Observations   1,895      2,120 




Appendix D. Randomization Check 
Table D1 reports the average of worker-level variables grouped by monitoring policy for both the 
AMT and Prolific samples. The means of these variables are highly similar across different monitoring 
policies. ANOVA tests suggest that the differences in worker-level variables are not statistically significant 
across different monitoring policy groups, except for a few exceptions that are likely to occur by chance, 
demonstrating proper randomization.    
Table D1. Randomization Check 
Panel A: AMT only_time no_disclosure controlled_ screenshots all_screenshots p-value 
Gender Female 0.554 0.592 0.537 0.556 0.388 
Education Less than high school 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.174 
 High school diploma or equivalent 0.104 0.083 0.104 0.069 0.180 
 Some college, no degree 0.169 0.268 0.22 0.213 0.003 
 Postsecondary nondegree award 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.817 
 Associate’s degree 0.132 0.11 0.097 0.124 0.335 
 Bachelor’s degree 0.452 0.406 0.376 0.457 0.033 
 Master’s degree 0.122 0.099 0.161 0.112 0.026 
 Doctoral or professional degree 0.010 0.024 0.03 0.017 0.154 
Race Asian or Asian American 0.094 0.064 0.061 0.074 0.201 
 Black or African American 0.069 0.088 0.082 0.101 0.359 
 Hispanic or Latino 0.055 0.066 0.072 0.082 0.405 
 White 0.747 0.759 0.759 0.718 0.425 
 other 0.035 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.730 
Panel B: Prolific only_time no_disclosure controlled_ screenshots all_screenshots p-value 
Gender Female 0.514 0.532 0.501 0.549 0.470 
Education Less than high school 0.004 0.004 0.019 0.006 0.038 
 High school diploma or equivalent 0.120 0.124 0.141 0.120 0.735 
 Some college, no degree 0.219 0.242 0.240 0.238 0.821 
 Postsecondary nondegree award 0.008 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.405 
 Associate’s degree 0.105 0.067 0.08 0.099 0.139 
 Bachelor’s degree 0.368 0.367 0.352 0.373 0.910 
 Master’s degree 0.135 0.155 0.135 0.127 0.646 
 Doctoral or professional degree 0.040 0.039 0.027 0.034 0.717 
Race Asian or Asian American 0.133 0.118 0.107 0.144 0.348 
 Black or African American 0.095 0.082 0.072 0.088 0.616 
 Hispanic or Latino 0.065 0.064 0.084 0.082 0.518 
 White 0.661 0.697 0.695 0.637 0.153 
 other 0.046 0.039 0.042 0.049 0.865 





Tables D2 and D3 summarize the treatment assignments by gender and by wage premium, respectively.  
Table D2. Treatment Assignments by Gender 
 AMT Prolific 
 Female  Male  Total Female  Male  Total 
only_time 272 219 491 244 231 475 
no_disclosure 270 186 456 248 218 466 
controlled_screenshots 254 219 473 238 237 475 
all_screenshots 264 211 475 256 210 466 
Total 1,060 835 1,895 986 896 1,882 
 
Table D3. Treatment Assignments by Wage Premium 
  Panel A: AMT   
wage 
premium 
wage of the 
monitored 
job 













-2 7 9 35 34 28 29 
-1.5 7.5 9 36 33 30 27 
-1 8 9 31 25 27 44 
-0.5 8.5 9 30 38 35 28 
0 9 9 24 25 38 38 
0.5 9 8.5 39 24 33 31 
1 9 8 37 34 31 25 
1.5 9 7.5 32 29 38 25 
2 9 7 35 27 33 34 
2.5 9 6.5 29 30 31 36 
3 9 6 30 39 24 34 
3.5 9 5.5 33 33 29 32 
4 9 5 34 25 28 35 
4.5 9 4.5 34 29 35 24 
5 9 4 32 31 33 33 
        Total   491 456 473 475 
  Panel B: Prolific   
wage 
premium 
wage of the 
monitored job 












-1 9 10 31 30 35 35 
-0.5 9.5 10 29 47 50 34 
0 10 10 27 39 28 38 
0.5 10 9.5 36 47 42 34 
1 10 9 39 32 48 37 
1.5 10 8.5 37 36 33 38 
2 10 8 45 38 35 40 
2.5 10 7.5 48 33 43 31 
3 10 7 43 52 38 44 
3.5 10 6.5 31 20 28 30 
4 10 6 44 33 37 33 
4.5 10 5.5 32 32 34 40 
5 10 5 33 27 24 32 




Appendix E. Full Sample Analysis on All Monitoring Policies 
In our main analysis, we run a series of subsample analyses that only consider the relevant groups 
summarized in Table 5 to estimate the effect of each monitoring dimension directly. Below we estimate the 
effects of the three dimensions of monitoring (i.e., intensity, transparency, and control) based on a full 
sample analysis on workers in all four monitoring groups. The effects of the different monitoring policies 
on job choices, using the only_time policy as the reference group, are summarized in Table E1. The 
significant and negative coefficients of no_disclosure in Columns 1 and 5 suggest that being transparent on 
low intensity monitoring can increase workers’ acceptance of monitoring. The significant and negative 
coefficients of all_screenshots in Columns 1 and 5 demonstrate that workers are less likely to choose 
monitored jobs as the intensity increases. The coefficients of controlled_screenshots and all_screenshots 
are not significantly different in either Column 1 or 5, suggesting again that providing workers with control 
over the collected information has no effect on workers’ propensity to accept monitoring. 
The positive and significant coefficients of all_screenshots in Columns 2 and 6 show that workers’ 
privacy concerns increase with the intensity of monitoring. The coefficients of no_disclosure are also 
positive in these two columns, suggesting that a lack of transparency on a low intensity monitoring policy 
can also significantly increase workers’ privacy concerns. In Columns 3 and 7, the coefficients of 
no_disclosure and all_screenshots are significantly different (p<0.05 and p<0.01 on the AMT and Prolific 
samples, respectively). 16 All the above findings are consistent with those discussed in Section 5.2. 
  
 
16 We use the “lincom” command in Stata to test whether the difference of the coefficients on no_disclosure and 
all_screenshots are significantly different from zero. 
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Table E1. Effects of Monitoring Policies on Perception and Acceptance of Monitoring  
 AMT Prolific  
 Choice  Privacy  Protection  Choice Choice Privacy  Protection  Choice 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
no_disclosure -0.070***  0.283***  -0.076  -0.040*  -0.069***  0.244***  -0.200**  -0.032  
 (0.025)  (0.092)  (0.088)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.089)  (0.087)  (0.024)  
controlled_screenshots -0.052**  0.274***  -0.016  -0.025  -0.039  0.091  -0.046  -0.027  
 (0.025)  (0.091)  (0.087)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.089)  (0.087)  (0.024)  
all_screenshots  -0.058**  0.188**  0.111  -0.046**  -0.069***  0.188**  0.061  -0.052**  
 (0.025)  (0.090)  (0.087)  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.089)  (0.087)  (0.024)  
male  -0.038**  0.123*  -0.124**  -0.020  -0.084***  0.132**  -0.176***  -0.061***  
 (0.018)  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.017)  
wage_premium  0.145***  -0.056***  0.024*  0.138***  0.153***  -0.061***  0.006  0.146***  
 (0.004)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.005)  
privacy    -0.093***     -0.107***  
    (0.006)     (0.006)  
protection    0.048***     0.053***  
    (0.006)     (0.007)  
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  1,895  1,895  1,895  1,895  1,882  1,882  1,882  1,882  
R2  0.412  0.062  0.048  0.511  0.337  0.037  0.025  0.455  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The reference group is only_time. The control variables include workers’ 
education, race, working experience, average hourly wage on the platform, prior experience with monitoring, and 
whether the job choice was made before measuring privacy concerns (AMT only). The results are similar when 
we do not include any worker-level control variables or when we use probit instead of LPM models for workers’ 





Appendix F. Modeling Inattentive Responses 
To alleviate the concern that our findings are driven by inattentive responses from workers, we re-
estimate the effect of monitoring policy on job choice using a finite mixture model that explicitly models 
workers’ inattention (Mas and Pallais 2017). Specifically, assuming that there is a probability of 𝜂𝜂 that a 
worker is inattentive and chooses randomly between the monitored and unmonitored jobs, Equation (6) can 
be adapted to the following: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛷𝛷(𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝜂𝜂) + 𝜂𝜂/2                       (F1) 
The parameters in the above model can be estimated using the maximum likelihood method. Table F1 
summarizes the results from the finite mixture model. The results in Table F1 are highly consistent with 
those results shown in Section 5.2, which demonstrate that our findings are unlikely to be driven by 
inattentive responses.  
Table F1. Effects of Monitoring Policies on Job Choices Using a Finite Mixture Model 
 AMT Prolific  
 Choice Choice Choice Choice Choice Choice 
Baseline only_time no_disclosure all_screenshots only_time no_disclosure all_screenshots 
Dimension Intensity Transparency Control Intensity Transparency Control 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
only_time  0.343***   0.364***  
  (0.114)   (0.141)  
controlled_screenshots   0.021   0.223 
   (0.098)   (0.187)  
all_screenshots  -0.326*** 0.058  -0.296* 0.069  
 (0.120)  (0.108)   (0.161)  (0.143)   
male  -0.357*** -0.244*** -0.196** -0.279* -0.444*** -0.381** 
 (0.125)  (0.090)  (0.099)  (0.163)  (0.126) (0.187)  
wage_premium  0.609*** 0.544*** 0.454*** 0.793*** 0.703*** 0.914*** 
 (0.068)  (0.056)  (0.027)  (0.111)  (0.093)  (0.137)  
𝜂𝜂 0.049 0.017 0.000 0.188 0.150 0.233 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.000) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  966 1,422 948 941 1,407 941 
Log-likelihood -405.87 -609.39 -441.17 -452.30  -679.41 -467.30 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The control variables include workers’ education, race, working experience, 
average hourly wage on the platform, prior experience with monitoring, and whether the job choice was made before 




Appendix G. Robustness Check on Reverse Causality 
As we explained in Section 3.3, to address the potential reverse causality, we proactively randomize 
the order of the questions on job choice and privacy concerns in the AMT experiment. In our main analysis, 
we account for the potential order effect by controlling for whether workers’ privacy concerns are measured 
before or after the job choice. As an alternative way to rule out the concern that a worker’s privacy concerns 
might be affected by his/her job choice, we rerun the analysis in Table E1 by focusing on the subsample of 
AMT workers whose privacy concerns are measured before their job choices. The results of this analysis 
are summarized in Table G1. The findings are consistent with those in Table E1, suggesting that our 
findings are unlikely to be an artifact of reverse causality. 
Table G1. Subsample Analysis on AMT Workers Whose Privacy Concerns Are Measured before Job 
Choices 
 Choice Privacy  Protection  Choice 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
no_disclosure -0.102*** 0.334*** -0.105 -0.072** 
 (0.037) (0.128) (0.126) (0.035) 
controlled_screenshots -0.080** 0.246* -0.021 -0.061* 
 (0.036) (0.126) (0.124) (0.034) 
all_screenshots  -0.060* 0.178 0.054 -0.050 
 (0.035) (0.122) (0.120) (0.033) 
male  -0.053** 0.200** -0.076 -0.035 
 (0.026) (0.090) (0.089) (0.025) 






privacy    -0.073*** 
    (0.009) 
protection    0.047*** 
    (0.009) 
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations  950 950 950 950 
R2  0.410 0.065 0.055 0.473 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The baseline monitoring policy group is only_time. The result is calculated based 
on the AMT sample because we only randomize the present order in the AMT experiment. The control variables 
include workers’ education, race, working experience, average hourly wage on the platform, and prior experience with 
monitoring. The results are similar when we do not include any worker-level control variables.  
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Appendix H. Results Using a PCA-based Privacy Concern Measure 
As explained in Appendix B, we use the average score of privacy-related questions to measure workers’ 
privacy concerns. In addition to the average score, we also consider using PCA to extract an integrated 
measure from the privacy concern scale. We remove the least relevant question (i.e., item 4) while 
conducting PCA, though the results are similar if we keep it. Following the convention of using one as the 
cutoff for eigenvalues (Kaiser 1960, Osborne et al. 2011), we retain only the first principal component that 
explains 72.0% and 68.9% of the variances in the AMT and Prolific samples, respectively. We re-estimate 
the models in Table E1 using this alternative privacy concern score obtained from PCA (denoted as 
PCA_privacy) and the results are summarized in Table H1. The results are highly similar to those in Table 
E1. 
Table H1. Results Using a PCA-based Privacy Concern Measure 
 AMT Prolific 
 Choice PCA_privacy Choice Choice PCA_Privacy Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
no_disclosure -0.070*** 0.370*** -0.041* -0.069*** 0.320*** -0.042* 
 (0.025) (0.122) (0.024) (0.027) (0.120) (0.025) 
controlled_screenshots -0.052** 0.359*** -0.024 -0.039 0.114 -0.029 
 (0.025) (0.120) (0.023) (0.027) (0.120) (0.025) 
all_screenshots -0.058** 0.245** -0.039* -0.069*** 0.249** -0.048* 
 (0.025) (0.120) (0.023) (0.027) (0.120) (0.025) 
male -0.038** 0.158* -0.026 -0.084*** 0.174** -0.069*** 
 (0.018) (0.087) (0.017) (0.019) (0.086) (0.018) 
wage_premium 0.145*** -0.074*** 0.139*** 0.153*** -0.081*** 0.146*** 
 (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005) 
pca_privacy   -0.078***   -0.085*** 
   (0.004)   (0.005) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,895 1,895 1,895 1,882 1,882 1,882 
R2 0.062 0.412 0.494 0.036 0.337 0.434 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The reference group is only_time. The control variables include workers’ 
education, race, working experience, average hourly wage on the platform, prior experience with monitoring, and 
whether the job choice was made before measuring privacy concerns (AMT only). The results are similar when 
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